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ABSTRACT 
United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) describes its vision for 
the global SOF network (GSN) as a globally networked force of special 
operations forces (SOF), interagency partners, and allies able to respond rapidly 
and persistently to regional contingencies and threats to stability. USSOCOM’s 
goals for the GSN are supported by three unique elements: capacity building, 
low-level presence, and the sum total of access agreements and posturing in the 
form of responsiveness. The command’s Special Operations Liaison Officer 
(SOLO) program embodies these three elements. 
In a time of shrinking budgets and personnel drawdowns, USSOCOM and 
supported special operations component commands are faced with critical 
decisions about shaping their respective forces for the future. This capstone 
focuses on the United States Army Special Forces (SF) officers’ role in the SOLO 
program by utilizing a multimethod approach to address concerns presented by 
SOLO program managers. 
To this end, we have presented three viable courses of action (COAs) for 
USSOCOM to pursue, in partnership with relevant stakeholders, for a renewed 
SOLO program. The COAs include: 1) enhancing the status quo, 2) capitalizing 
on historical lessons, and 3) aligning with current United States Army Special 
Operations Command (USASOC) initiatives. While current demands are 
significant, we can always look to our past to see our future.  
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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE SOLO CHALLENGE 
United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) describes its 
vision for the global SOF network (GSN) as a globally networked force of special 
operations forces (SOF), interagency partners, and allies able to respond rapidly 
to, and persistently address, regional contingencies and threats to stability.1 The 
creation and sustainment of the GSN is intended to accomplish two critical goals. 
The first is to improve the strategic reach of the United States and enable SOF to 
respond more rapidly and effectively to emerging threats while deterring future 
ones. The second is to strengthen relationships and capabilities of strategic 
partners to create more stable and secure environments while increasing the 
capacity for joint-regional operations.2  
USSOCOM’s goals for the GSN are supported by three elements: 1) 
capacity building, 2) small footprints and low-level presence, and 3) the sum total 
of access agreements and posturing in the form of responsiveness.3 Capacity 
building is set to draw heavily upon the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) SOF headquarters (HQ) model as USSOCOM seeks to establish its 
regional SOF coordination centers (RSCCs). Small footprints and low-level 
presence in turn consists of three additional components: liaison, small-scale 
building partner capacity (BPC), and shaping and surveillance.4 One aspect of 
liaison, in context of the GSN, is the special operations liaison officer, or SOLO.  
The Defense Strategic Guidance of 2012 calls for “small-footprint, low cost 
approaches to ensure U.S. security in a world of global, transnational threats.”5 
1 William H. McRaven, USSOCOM Special Operations Forces 2020, May 10, 2013, 6. 
2 USSOCOM The GSN, March 22 2012, as cited in Thomas S. Szayna and William Welser 
IV, Developing and Assessing Options for the Global SOF Network (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2013), 1. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century 
(Washington, DC: DOD, January 2012). 
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The SOLO program, as one aspect of small footprints, is a critical component of 
both the GSN’s and USSOCOM’s answer to the most recent Defense Strategic 
Guidance. A renewed SOLO program is the central focus of this study. 
The SOLO program dates back to 2006 when then-USSOCOM 
Commander, U.S. Army General Bryan D. Brown, identified the need for SOF 
representation in select partner nations. In 2007, the first SOLO was assigned to 
the United Kingdom on temporary duty status. Subsequent USSOCOM 
Commanders, Admiral Olsen and Admiral McRaven, continued their support for 
the SOLO program to its current strength of 13 officers. Admiral McRaven has 
approved the program to grow to 40 officers by 2019. The anticipated size of the 
SOLO program may be small when compared to other programs, but its size 
does not reflect its importance. Since the first U.S. Army officer served as a 
SOLO in 2007, the USSOCOM Personnel Directorate has worked “for years”6 to 
develop the SOLO program’s human resource process. Despite improvements, it 
is described within the USSOCOM Force Management Division (FMD) as a 
reactive process7 with the following frictions that the we identified by the close of 
2013.  
• No officer who had served as a SOLO had ever been promoted 
• The SOLO program was having difficulty finding qualified personnel 
• The SOLO program was largely unknown outside of USSOCOM 
• All SOLO assignments were considered terminal 
• Officers assigned as SOLOs received no interagency, language, or 
cultural training 
• The SOLO’s family was left unprepared for life away from a U.S. 
base in a foreign country 
In May 2013, the USSOCOM International Engagement Program (IEP) 
provided funding to the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) for a study concerning 
6 Derived from a small group discussion with USSOCOM Force Management Division at 
USSOCOM Headquarters, Tampa, FL, December 7, 2013. 
7 PowerPoint Presentation created by Robert Corl, U.S. Special Operations Command: 
SOLO/SOST Programs, J1-Leadership Development (Tampa, FL: U.S. Special Operations 
Command Headquarters, November 2012), slide 2. 
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the development of a regional special operations career path for SOF officers. 
The USSOCOM J55, the Directorate of International Engagement, centrally 
manages the USSOCOM IEP. The intent of this study was to produce a formal 
career path for SOLOs that would eliminate most, if not all, the current frictions, 
without generating additional issues. The J55 envisioned a formal, regional SOF 
career track that would generate sufficient numbers of liaison officers to 
accomplish USSOCOM’s second-highest priority, expand the GSN.  
The SOLO is embedded in the partner nation’s SOF HQ and is part of the 
U.S. country team. It is the SOLO’s responsibility to serve as the single point of 
contact for all SOF entities in-country and report to both the Chief of Mission 
(COM) and to the respective Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC). 
SOF officers currently assigned as SOLOs are the main effort and center of 
gravity of the IEP,8 yet the six previously listed frictions continue to affect the 
program. Thus, the J55 issued a list of the nine following questions it wanted 
answered in the course of this study.  
• What is the level of interest of SOF operators for a regional SOF 
foreign area officer (FAO) career path? 
• What are the benefits and hindrances of creating an alternate or 
secondary career path for SOF? 
• At what point in a SOF career does each USSOCOM component 
offer this regional SOF career path as a viable option? 
• Should the regional SOF career path be available to all SOF 
operators throughout their career or a closed community? 
• Can the alternate career path be designed for senior level non-
commissioned officers (NCOs) and warrant officers, as well as 
officers? 
• Beyond the SOLO program, what other positions could a SOF 
international career path officer fill? 
• What percentage of SOF operators is desired to create and 
maintain the career path? 
8 Roy McClellan, Tommy Macias, and Adam Kordish, Special Operations Liaison Officers 
(SOLO): Strategic Liaison Within the Expanding Global Special Operations Forces Network, 
Information Paper (Tampa, FL: USSOCOM Headquarters [J55], June 12, 2013), 1. 
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• What are the predicted promotion possibilities and opportunities for 
command? 
• What are the ideal career fields from each service for selection to 
the regional SOF career field? 
The purpose of the study was to explore a “regional SOF career track.” 
The J55’s objectives for the career track included the growth of the SOLO 
program to its targeted size of 40 personnel, sustainment of the program at 40 
personnel, and enabling the promotion of officers assigned as SOLOs to the 
grade of O–6. 
After our initial exploration of the topic (see details in the methodology 
description in Chapter II), it appeared that the research questions needed to be 
reframed and the scope narrowed given the time available for this study. Thus, 
the research was limited to U.S. Army special forces (SF) officer participation in 
the SOLO program. The authors reframed the question: How can we provide a 
regionally focused “SOF FAO” capability to USSOCOM? We widened the 
aperture bearing on the initial question by refocusing on the capability and 
narrowed the scope of the problem by focusing only U.S. Army SF officers 
instead of SOF officers from all branches of service. With this new approach in 
place, we offer this product to the sponsor in the time available. The following 
supporting questions helped narrow the scope to focus on Army SF officers. 
• Can parallels from other programs inform a renewed regional SOF 
career track/program: 
• U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer Program (FAO: 1973–
Present)? 
• U.S. Army Foreign Area Specialist Program (FASP: 1947–
1973)? 
• U.S. Army Military Advisor Officer Program (MAOP: 1969–
1973) 
• Based on this review of other programs, what features could inform 
a renewed SOLO program? 
• Based on this review of other programs, what life cycle model could 
inform a renewed SOLO program? 
 4 
• What issues are likely to impede the implementation of a renewed 
SOLO program and how can SOF address them? 
To address these questions, the remainder of this study is comprised of 
the following chapters. Chapter II presents the methodology used in collecting 
and analyzing data to answer the four questions that guide this study. Chapter III 
provides a comprehensive description of the SOLO program and life cycle. 
Chapter IV describes the U.S. Army’s FAO, and especially its precursor 
programs that can inform a renewed SOLO program. Next, the parallels are 
illuminated in the genesis of the FAO’s precursor programs that bear directly on 
USSOCOM’s contemporary SOLO program. These precursors to FAO, the 
Foreign Area Specialist Program (FASP) and the Military Advisor Officer 
Program (MAOP), provide a historical blueprint for the J55’s contemporary 
requirements. Chapter V gives an in-depth analysis and present courses of 
action (COAs) for consideration. Chapter VI concludes the study on this design 
challenge.  
 5 
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II. STUDY METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This capstone project’s intent is to aid in the development of the SOLO 
program. While acknowledging the multiservice complexities surrounding the 
USSOCOM SOLO program, the specific focus of this project was dedicated to 
Army-centric aspects. The primary reason for narrowing down research to this 
one DOD service was due to multiservice research complexity. It was not 
possible to examine all DOD services in an acceptable manner in the limited time 
available. Service familiarity and access also played a significant role; our 
research team participating in this capstone project is comprised of all Army SF 
officers. Although the course of this project was modified substantially as the 
study progressed, the purpose remained focused on illuminating potential COAs 
that could be used to advance the SOLO program. This chapter describes the 
research methods used to gather information and how the data was analyzed to 
inform our recommendations. 
B. ESTABLISHING THE FOUNDATION 
We began our efforts with the USSOCOM J55 research proposal that 
formally requested assistance from NPS. The supporting questions, listed in 
Chapter I, posed by the J55 before departing NPS for USSOCOM headquarters 
in Tampa, Florida were reviewed. We met with the project sponsor at USSOCOM 
to determine if the problem statement was framed properly, and whether the 
forthcoming research plan matched the needs of all the stakeholders. 
Initially, we met with the J55 Director, FMD Chief, Personnel Directorate 
(J1) representative and seven current SOLOs who had travelled to USSOCOM 
HQ to participate in an annual SOLO conference. Soon after the meeting began, 
a U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel (O–5) serving as a SOLO provided his estimate 
that up to 35% of USSOCOM SOLOs are “curtailed, divorced, or returned their 
dependents early (ERD) as a result of their SOLO assignment.” The officer 
 7 
supported his statement by naming the SOLOs who met one of the three criteria, 
and the remaining SOLOs concurred. No one present at the meeting objected to 
this assertion.  
The approximate “1/3 assumption” became a valid and necessary 
planning factor for the project team. Unless data could be found to counter this 
assumption, no rationale or justification existed for a program with about a 1/3 
chance of generating a failure for the officer’s family. Service component buy-in 
for a USSOCOM program with this statistical record would likely remain limited, 
at best.  
Most importantly, the J55’s current “main effort” for accomplishing the 
Commander (CDR), USSOCOM’s priority #2 (expand the GSN) was directly at 
odds with the CDR’s priority #3 (preservation of the force and families), as well 
as priority #1 (win the current fight). As Admiral McRaven stated, “We cannot win 
the current fight without preserving the force and its families.”9 At this point, it 
became clear that this study would require some more in-depth analysis. 
C. MULTIMETHOD  
1. Archival Research 
a. Foreign Area Officer History: Looking Back to Illuminate the 
Future 
We pursued what the U.S. Army had done when a “SOF FAO” capability 
was needed in time of protracted war. In particular, we relied on then-U.S. Army 
MAJ Neil Haggerty’s detailed history of the U.S. Army’s FAO program. 
Haggerty’s academic thesis was published at the USMC Staff College in 1974 
and is described in detail in Chapter IV of this study. MAJ Haggerty revealed the 
deliberate steps that the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army took in building and 
implementing the FAO program in 1973. Equally important, his work illuminates 
parallels with the contemporary SOLO program in describing the MAOP and the 
9 ADM McRaven, “Interview,” Special Warfare Magazine 25, no. 2 (April–June 2012): 10. 
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FASP that were merged into the FAO program, a possible endgame for the 
current SOLO program.  
b. Contemporary Program Research 
We conducted archival research on the following programs: the 
USSOCOM SOLO program, the current U.S. Army FAO program, and the 
USSOCOM special operations support teams (SOST) program. Exploration of 
the life cycle model of the three programs enabled us to gain an understanding of 
how these programs functioned. The human resource life cycle describes the 
structure, assessment/selection, skill development/training, assignment 
processes, professional development, and promotion of the human resources. 
These aspects are predominately based on human resource management 
(HRM) and not the operational function of the programs. Our archival data relied 
heavily upon both DOD officially published documents and unofficial PowerPoint 
presentations produced by the various stakeholders. Due to the constantly 
changing environment, these PowerPoint presentations provided the most 
accurate, although unofficially published, data. 
(1) Army Foreign Area Officer Program. Although the Army FAO 
program is not inherently special operations focused, it has many duty 
description and environmental similarities with the SOLO program. The Army 
FAO program was specifically selected because it is the largest FAO program in 
the DOD and it dedicates more time and training resources per FAO compared to 
the other services. The early accessions and single career track of an Army FAO 
allow the longest length of time to learn and implement the profession. While all 
the services’ programs have their strengths, the Army FAO training program has 
been unofficially described as the “gold standard” of joint FAO programs.10 Last, 
the majority of the personnel who will be performing SOLO duties will come from 
the Army. As of March 2014, the J55 has allocated 26 of 40 projected SOLO 
10 Amy A. Alrich, Joseph Adams, and Claudio C. Biltoc, The Strategic Value of Foreign Area 
Officers (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analysis, August 2013), 47.  
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billets to the Army. This reason alone legitimizes this capstone project’s focus on 
Army centric systems.  
Each department within the DOD operates differently and has a unique 
culture, which should factor into the implementation of a new program. The 
description and analysis of the Army FAO program may or may not benefit the 
Air Force, Marine, and Navy portion of the SOLO program. However, the submit 
that capitalizing on Army FAO lessons learned could prevent wasted time and 
resources especially when developing the Army centric aspects of the SOLO 
program. 
(2) Special Operations Support Team. Archival data were collected 
and analyzed on the USSOCOM SOST program because of similar roles the 
SOST and SOLO programs perform in the GSN. With similar billet numbers, 
approximately 40, the programs’ size match up. USSOCOM also centrally 
manages both programs with the personnel support of their parent services. 
2. Stakeholder Working Groups 
As the archival data accumulated, we began incorporating field 
information from SOLO program stakeholder working groups. Over the course of 
this study, we worked with 35 individuals representing 14 SOLO stakeholder 
organizations listed in Table 1. Dialog with stakeholders was critical to 
understanding the unique aspects of each SOLO assignment. We identified 
SOLO program stakeholders as those with the formal power to make a decision 
affecting the SOLO program, those with the power to block a decision, those 




11 David A. Straus, How to Make Collaboration Work: Powerful Ways to Build Consensus, 
Solve Problems, and Make Decisions (San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2002), 40, 
Kindle Edition. 
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Table 1.   SOLO Program Stakeholders 








































































































Stakeholders were categorized into those who perform management 
functions in the SOLO program, end users of the program, force providers to the 
program, and subject matter experts. Means of communication with the 
stakeholders varied to include face-to-face working groups, video and telephonic 
communication, and electronic mail. Stakeholders not directly connected to the 
SOLO program provided input on their respective programs (FAO and SOST), as 
well as their input on the SOLO program. Table 1 also identifies stakeholders not 
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involved due to time and resource limitations. Due to the critical role they have 
with the SOLO program, the research team recommends that they be included in 
future research. They submit that this stakeholder table does not necessarily 
capture all pertinent stakeholders. 
3. Comparative Case Studies 
Comparative analysis of the SOLO, SOST, and Army FAO programs 
identified their positive and negative factors. Organizational design case studies 
were standardized along human resource life cycle functions. These life cycle 
functions consisted of structure, assessment/selection, skill development/training, 
assignment processes, professional development, and promotion. We created a 
spreadsheet capturing the three programs’ life cycle positive and negative factors 
highlighted during archival research. Stakeholder feedback helped verify the 
validity of our factor assessment, as well as contributing their own assessment. 
Comparing case studies identified positive trends to be adopted, negative trends 
to mitigate, and current SOLO factors that should be maintained in our COAs. 
Spreadsheet analysis helped illuminate potential SOLO HRM and structural 
changes that could reduce the frictions inherent in the current SOLO program.  
D. COURSES OF ACTION  
COAs evolved from archival data, data from stakeholder working groups, 
and the comparative case studies. To create the COAs, we utilized the standard 
military decision making process (MDMP) COA criteria of: suitability, feasibility, 
acceptability, distinguishability, and completeness. FM 101–5 defines COA 
suitability as accomplishing the mission and complying with the commander’s 
guidance; feasibility as the capability to accomplish the mission in terms of 
available time, space, and resources; acceptability as the advantage gained by 
executing the COA must justify the cost in resources; distinguishability as each 
COA must differ significantly from any others regarding task organization and 
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scheme of maneuver; and completeness as the COA must complete the mission 
statement.12  
For this project, we believe the criteria of suitability, feasibility and 
acceptability, are vital. Figure 1 illustrates how the methods directly relate to COA 
development. End results of this project are three potential COAs and several 




Figure 1.  Course of Action Development 
12 FM 101–5, Staff Organization and Operations, May 1997, 5–11. 
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III. DESCRIPTION OF THE SOLO PROGRAM’S LIFE-CYCLE 
A. PURPOSE 
This chapter provides a description and general overview of the genesis, 
current state of affairs, and proposed future, of the SOLO program. This 
description provides a solid base to compare and contrast with other case 
studies to draw parallels and identify positive and negative aspects that inform 
recommendations to improve the SOLO program. Specifically, the description is 
focused on the current HRM processes of the SOLO program associated with the 
development of a life-cycle model. 
1. The Genesis of the SOLO Program 
a. Background 
In 2006, then-USSOCOM Commander, General Bryan D. Brown, 
identified the need for SOF representation in select partner nations (PNs) to fulfill 
the following duties and responsibilities. 
A SOLO’s primary function is to coordinate United States SOF 
(USSOF) development efforts at foreign national level SOF 
command headquarters (HQ) and to facilitate establishment and 
nurturing of institutional relationships to the partner nation’s (PN) 
Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of the Interior, and 
civilian leadership. Additionally, the SOLO acts as the SOF advisor 
to the U.S. Chief of Mission, the country team, and the PN SOF 
commander. SOLOs are responsible for maintaining visibility over 
all U.S. SOF activities within the PN and to coordinate SOF 
activities in support of the Mission Strategic Resourcing Plan in 
coordination with the Senior Defense Official while also assisting 
the TSOC in the development of PN special operations capabilities 
and capacities from the strategic through the tactical level.13 
 
13 David Bills, J55, White Paper (Tampa, FL: U.S. Special Operations Command 
Headquarters, August 2012), 1. 
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General Brown began taking steps to fulfill this need by emplacing a SOLO in the 
United Kingdom as the initial “test-bed” for this concept. In January 2007, the first 
SOLO was assigned on temporary duty (TDY) status to the United Kingdom.14 
Following General Brown’s tenure as the Commander of USSOCOM, Admiral 
Olsen (Commander USSOCOM from July 2007 to August 2011), and the current 
Commander, Admiral McRaven, have supported the program and have grown it 
to its current state. Presently, SOLOs are supporting 13 countries (Figure 2) in 
every Geographical Combatant Command (GCC). Of these current 13 active 
SOLO assignments, U.S. Army officers between the ranks of Major and Colonel 
fill 10 of them. Of these 10, nine are U.S. Army SF officers and one is a U.S. 
Army FAO (who was previously a U.S. Army SF officer). Additionally, approved 
plans call for 27 more countries to receive SOLO billets by 2019. All 13 of the 
currently assigned officers serving in the SOLO program are in a permanent 
change of station (PCS) status. PCS status supports a more persistent presence 
in the supported PN and affords the assigned officers the opportunity to be 
accompanied by their families, if applicable. 
Placing senior SOF officers in SOLO billets, serving an average of three 
years in length, helps signify the importance of the relationship between the two 
countries, as well as aiding in relationship and trust building.15  
14 Derived from archival data maintained at the USSOCOM J55, March 2014.  
15 A common theme derived from the officers assigned to the SOLO program and the SOLO 
program managers who participated in the SOLO week at USSOCOM HQ in December 2013.  
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Figure 2.  Countries Currently Being Supported by SOLOs (as of May 
15, 2014) 
b. Structure 
The SOLO program is currently managed in the USSOCOM J5 
(Directorate of Strategy, Plans, and Policy) by the J55 (International Engagement 
Division). This program is the “[M]ain [E]ffort and [C]enter of [G]ravity of the 
International Engagement Program (IEP),”16 and as such, the J55 allocates 
considerable resources in the management of this initiative (i.e., time, manpower, 
funding). The J55 manages the recruitment, training, and emplacing of U.S. Army 
SF) officers selected to serve in the SOLO program. Once employed, the officers 
serve under the operational control (OPCON) of the TSOC CDR in the respective 
TSOC area of responsibility (AOR). The officer assigned to the SOLO program is 
employed under National Security Decision Directive-38 (See Figure 3), vice 
Title-10 (like the majority of U.S. military forces employed throughout the world).  
16 McClellan, Macias, and Kordish, Special Operations Liaison Officers (SOLO): Strategic 
Liaison Within the Expanding Global Special Operations Forces Network, 1.  
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Figure 3.  NSDD-3817 
 In other words, the officer is part of the U.S. country team to guarantee the 
officer space in the embassy and a position that affords the latitude to work both 
in the embassy and PN HQ based on operational needs. 
Operationally, officers assigned to the SOLO program work directly for the 
TSOC CDR (depicted by the solid line in Figure 4), subject to the COM’s 
authority. Administratively, this officer receives support from USSOCOM through 
the J55, in cooperation with the USSOCOM FMD (delineated by the dashed lines 
in Figure 4). 
17 U.S. Department of State, “National Security Decision Directive (NSSD) 38,” accessed 
April 30, 2014, http://www.state.gov/m/pri/nsdd/.  
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Figure 4.  SOLO Operational and Administrative Relationships 
During Admiral McRaven’s tenure as CDR, USSOCOM established the 
FMD to manage all USSOCOM personnel-related functions.18 The FMD is 
comprised of the J1 (Directorate of Personnel), J7/J9 (Directorate of Training, 
Doctrine, and Capability Development), Joint Special Operations University 
(JSOU), and Preservation of the Force and Families.19 As such, the FMD has 
been assigned personnel management duties for Army SF officers assigned to 
the SOLO program. The relationship between the officer assigned to the SOLO 
program, the FMD, and the J55 is currently influx. The J55 and the FMD are 
18 Ascertained from collaborative working group meetings held at USSOCOM HQ, Tampa, 
FL during the SOLO week in December 2013. 
19 United States Special Operations Command, U.S. Special Operations Command: Fact 
Book 2013 (Tampa, FL: U.S. Special Operations Command Headquarters, 2013), 10.  
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currently collaborating to work through all the various dynamics of adding another 
layer of bureaucracy to the HRM system. 
This HRM system is further complicated by the fact that the SOLO 
program is comprised of officers who belong to a separate service, not 
USSOCOM (in this study’s case, the Army). The SF Branch at HRC 
Headquarters in Fort Knox, Kentucky, and the SF Regimental Proponency at Fort 
Bragg, NC manage the career of an Army SF officer. USSOCOM does not 
manage the career progression of a U.S. Army SF officer assigned as a SOLO. 
The U.S. Army and Special Forces Branch manage the careers of all U.S. Army 
SF officers. While U.S. Army officers assigned as SOLOs will fall under 
USSOCOM or a TSOC for the time that they are assigned to a position under 
such commands, they will only do so for the period of their assignment. This 
importance is illuminated in subsequent chapters. 
c. Life-Cycle Model 
The current SOLO program does not have a life-cycle model, whose 
development is, in part, one of the purposes of this study. 
(1) Accessions Process. The accessions process is an ongoing cycle 
as the SOLO program and the list of PNs it is supporting grows. USSOCOM has 
provided the ideal accessions process shown in Figure 5. The current accessions 
process, consisting of recruitment, or nomination, and selection, is an 18–24 
month process. Accessions is initiated when the demand signal is identified by 
the J55 SOLO program managers.20 The J1-Leadership Development (LD) will 
then conduct an after action review (AAR), in which the focus is on identifying the 
desired competencies and requirements for the respective SOLO position. Then, 
on a bi-annual basis, the J1-LD will produce a “call for nominations” 
announcement that will be disseminated throughout the service SOF component 
commands (e.g., United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) 
20 A plan is in place to expand the SOLO program through 2019. Most billets have been 
identified and coded for officers representing a service component SOF command (i.e., coded for 
an O–4, U.S. Army 18A SFO).  
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will distribute to the U.S. Army SF population). The candidates will then be 
considered for service in the SOLO program by a board consisting of the J1-LD, 
J55, TSOC CDR, and USSOCOM Chief of Staff (COS).21 Once an SF officer is 
selected, that individual is notified through the SF branch at Human Resources 
Command (HRC).  
 
Figure 5.  SOLO Accessions Cycle22 
In March 2014, the FMD developed a plan to implement its recruitment 
plan through the use of four different avenues: 1) a strategic communications 
plan, 2) relying on individual SF officers to self-nominate for the positions, 3) 
reaching out to intermediate level education institutions for potential nominees, 
and 4) working with TSOCs to identify potential candidates who have already 
21 It is important to note that the TSOC CDR retains the right to deny any candidate who is 
recommended to serve as a SOLO within their AOR. The ability to stop SF officers from serving 
as a SOLO is also retained by the USASOC CDR.  
22 Adapted from PowerPoint Presentation created by Robert Corl, U.S. Special Operations 
Command: SOLO/SOST Programs, J1-Leadership Development (Tampa, FL: U.S. Special 
Operations Command Headquarters, November 2012), slide 3. 
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garnered some of the valuable TSOC experience already identified as a key 
qualification.23 As of May 2014, this plan has not been initiated. 
(2) Skill Acquisition Cycle. Due to the current ad-hoc and reactive 
nature of the assignments in SOLO program, SF officers have been selected and 
employed without receiving opportunities to acquire the requisite skills. 
Additionally, it applies to the maintenance/enhancement of previously trained 
skills, such as language. This is not to imply that the SOLO program is not 
receiving “trained” or ‘qualified” officers to serve in the program. Many of the 
Army SF officers selected to serve as SOLOs have entered the program with 
similar attributes that USSOCOM and program stakeholders have identified. 
While some desired skills come with the officer to the assignment, USSOCOM 
and other stakeholders have recommended the development of a formal skill 
acquisition cycle.24  
According to USSOCOM SOLO program managers in the J55, the 
selected U.S. Army SF officers have all been between the rank of Major (O–4) 
and Colonel (O–6), have experience working at USSOCOM or TSOCs, and have 
been determined to be language competent “enough” to serve as a SOLO.25 
Throughout the course of a SF officer’s career, that officer will be assigned to an 
operational group that will likely serve in a TSOC AOR, or be assigned to a 
TSOC, and will obtain the experience desired. If the selected officers do not have 
either of these experiences, USSOCOM intends to work with service assignment 
officers to provide an equivalent opportunity prior to their employment as a SOLO 
(Figure 5).  
23 Force Management Division, U.S. Special Operations Command Special Operations 
Liaison Officer (SOLO) and Special Operations Support Team (SOST) Overt Road Map Concept 
(Tampa, FL: United States Special Operations Command Headquarters). Adapted from the 
PowerPoint Presentation, March 4, 2014, Slide 16. 
24 Ascertained from collaborative design working group meetings held during SOLO Week at 
USSOCOM HQ, December 2013.  
25 Information gleaned over the course of Collaborative Design Working Groups held at 
USSOCOM HQ December 6, 2013. It should be noted that the term “enough” is used to identify 
that the decision was made based on language requirements to facilitate the SOLO functions in a 
PN. For example, the SOLO in Canada can get by with English while this may not be the case in 
all other PNs.  
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All Army SF officers are trained in at least one language that corresponds 
with their assigned operational group AOR (i.e., an officer assigned to 10th 
Special Forces Group (Airborne) will be trained in German, French, or Russian). 
According to Army Regulation (AR) 600–3, all SF officers are required to 
maintain proficiency in their target language by testing annually in either of the 
two approved testing mediums, the defense language proficiency test (DLPT) or 
the oral proficiency interview (OPI).26 The ideal SF officer in the SOLO program 
would have a 3/3 rating in the target language, but the current minimum accepted 
by USSOCOM is listed as a 2/2.27 Although, not all officers currently serving as 
SOLOs are a 2/2, or even a 1/1, in their target language, the program continues 
to move forward. 
An example of the USSOCOM desired timeline for the skill acquisition 
cycle is depicted in Figure 6. The proposed example timeline includes one year 
of Foreign Professional Military Education (PME), or U.S. PME equivalents, and 
two years of TSOC/regional experience to be followed by a 3-year tour of duty as 
a SOLO in an assigned country. In total, this proposed skill acquisition timeline 
would take three years, vice the one to 1.5 year PME timeline for traditional PME 
completion required by U.S. Army and Service component regulations.28 This 
extended timeline is due to USSOCOM’s desire to employ a SF officer at a 
TSOC to garner experience in a future assigned AOR. 
26 AR 600–3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management, 
Headquarters (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, February 1, 2010), 169. 
27 Force Management Division, U.S. Special Operations Command Special Operations 
Liaison Officer (SOLO) and Special Operations Support Team (SOST) Overt Road Map Concept 
(Tampa, FL: United States Special Operations Command Headquarters). PowerPoint 
Presentation, March 4, 2014, slide 3.  
28 This point is made to merely highlight the amount of time and give context to the additional 
time that would be required for a formal career track, which includes this skill acquisition cycle.  
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Figure 6.  SOLO Skill Acquisition Cycle29 
(3) Assignment Cycle. As of March 2014, all Army SF officers assigned 
to the SOLO program have served only one assignment as a SOLO before 
retiring or moving to their next assignment. Therefore, the lack of repeat 
assignments makes it impossible to indicate whether this cycle could, or would, 
include multiple utilization tours as a SOLO for an SF officer. Before the SF 
officer is assigned as a SOLO, USSOCOM FMD personnel must process a 
request for an officer that fits their desires for the position (i.e., a SF Lieutenant 
Colonel who is a 3/3 in Arabic and has experience in the SOCCENT AOR and/or 
at the TSOC level). Notably, the TSOC Commander retains the right to veto any 
nominated officer to a SOLO billet in their AOR. The assignment of the approved 
officer to the SOLO program is then staffed at HRC through the SF branch 
personnel and approved through an annual manning conference. 
USSOCOM is currently filling the SOLO billets with officers placed in 
already codified USSOCOM and TSOC billets. Currently, 14 USSOCOM billets 
are codified in the Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) for SOLOs. Of the 13 
currently serving SOLOs, 11 are in USSOCOM billets and two are in TSOC 
billets. The current assignment cycle is conducted in this manner (ad-hoc, create 
29 Force Management Division, U.S. Special Operations Command Special Operations 
Liaison Officer, adapted from Slide 5. 
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ways to fill positions) to facilitate the continual flow of SOLOs to valued PNs, 
which is done within the confines of a downsizing military, shrinking budgets, and 
the build-out of the TSOCs from USSOCOM billets. This build-out of TSOCs is 
part of Admiral McRaven’s plan, and responsibility,30 to organize all SOF in a 
manner that “supports the goals and objectives of the Defense Strategic 
Guidance; and to provide combat ready forces to the President and the Secretary 
of Defense to meet the challenges of today’s security environment.”31 
Once assigned to the SOLO billet, the SF officer will receive PCS orders 
for one to three years (depending on place of assignment; most assignments are 
three years minimum). If a multiyear assignment, an officer serving in the SOLO 
program may be able to travel accompanied by family. The investment of a U.S. 
service member and family indicates the level of commitment of the United 
States Government (USG) to PNs, as well as to facilitate the building of 
relationships and trust. USSOCOM is currently working to establish a more 
conducive assignment cycle to the enhancement of an officer’s career following 
an assignment as a SOLO.32  
(4) Professional Development Cycle. No, formalized professional 
development cycle has been established at this time. The J55 is working 
collectively with the FMD to create a program of record establishing the 
bureaucratic mechanisms that will support professional development.  
It is important to understand that USSOCOM does not control the career 
progression timelines of U.S. Army SF officers. The SF Regimental Proponency 
and the Department of the Army Human Resources Command control the career 
progression of U.S. Army SF officers’ doctrine and codified processes outlined in 
30 Title 10 U.S. Code Sections 164 and 167.  
31 William McRaven, “Posture Statement Before the 113th Congress House Armed Services 
Committee,” March 6, 2013, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20130306/100394/HHRG-
113-AS00-Wstate-McRavenUSNA-20130306.pdf, 1.  
32 Gleaned from Collaborative Design Working Groups held at USSOCOM Headquarters, 
Tampa, FL, December 6, 2013.  
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documents, such as AR 600–3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development 
and Career Management. 
The J55 has developed an “ideal” professional development cycle similar 
to what the U.S. Army FAO program utilizes. Figure 7 is an example of what 
USSOCOM is proposing as an alternate professional development cycle for SF 
officers. On the left, is the “ideal” SF officer’s progression along what is referred 
to as the “operational or command track.” On the right is the proposed SOLO 
progression model. This proposed career progression and professional 
development cycle has not been approved or implemented by either concerned 
party (USSOCOM or SF Regimental Proponency) at this time. 
 
Figure 7.  Proposed Professional Development Cycle for U.S. Army SF 
Officers Who Serve as SOLOs33 
33 Adapted from the J55 International Engagement Program, United States Special 
Operations Command, The International Engagement Program: Establishing Persistent, 
Culturally Attuned Engagement, PowerPoint Presentation, February 27, 2013, Slide 4. 
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(5) Promotion. No U.S. Army SF officer has been promoted from the 
rank of O–5 to O–6 following an assignment as a SOLO.34 Furthermore, no 
promotion mechanism is in place for SF officers who serve in SOLO billets since 
the duty of SOLO is not codified as being “key and developmental” (KD) as per 
Army Regulation 600–3.35 In SF, and the Army Maneuver Fires and Effects 
division, the successful completion of KD assignments listed in Figure 8 make a 
Major eligible to compete for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. The 
only KD assignment for SF officers at the rank of LTC is a Battalion Command. 
For an officer to be eligible for promotion to the rank of Colonel, it will be 
necessary to have completed a Battalion Command.  
 
Figure 8.  SF Major “KD” Assignments 
SF officers will also need to serve in other positions prior to competing for 
promotion to the rank of LTC or colonel. The officers who desire to remain more 
34 Ascertained during collaborative working groups at USSOCOM HQ, December 4, 2013. 
35 AR 600–3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management, 
169–171. 
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competitive for promotion and selection for a command assignment will seek a 
“broadening” assignment (refer to Figure 9 for current broadening assignments). 
These assignments, while not KD, will help to favorably pad an officer’s profile for 
promotion. As of May 2014, the SOLO assignment is not listed as one of these 
assignments. 
 
Figure 9.  SF Major Post KD Assignments 
While the service as a SOLO is valuable to the USSOCOM enterprise as a 
whole, its non-codification in U.S. Army governing documents and promotion 
boards leaves this portion of the SOLO life-cycle model unaddressed. 
B. SUMMARY 
Understanding the basics of the HRM processes associated with the 
SOLO program provides program managers and stakeholders alike with the 
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requisite base from which to compare other programs. We next move into a 
comparative analysis to highlight parallels between programs that offer similar 
capabilities and have faced similar issues. 
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IV. COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES 
What has been will be again, 
What has been done will be done again; 
There is nothing new under the sun. 
—Ecclesiastes 1:9 
Chapter IV describes how a problem set very similar to the one currently 
faced by the SOLO program has been encountered and addressed in the past. 
This historical perspective is presented in two parts. First, the Army’s FAO 
program is described from its origin following the merger of two preceding 
programs. The longest running precursor to the modern U.S. Army FAO program 
was FASP, the U.S. Army’s solution to providing foreign and regional specialists 
following World War II. The second precursor was the U.S. Army’s MAOP, which 
was established to meet the Army’s operations focused requirements during the 
Vietnam War. The MAOP/FASP/FAO relationship is shown in Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10.  A Precedent from History; The Merger of Similar Programs 
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Frictions in the evolutionary stages of the U.S. Army FAO program are 
identified that indirectly or directly correlate to USSOCOM’s post-9/11 solution for 
building a GSN, the SOLO program. Throughout this chapter, we present 
compelling parallels between the USSOCOM SOLO program and a similar U.S. 
Army program, the MAOP, which faced analogous issues over 40 years ago. 
Furthermore, we argue the success of the U.S. Army’s FAO program is 
attributable to the intentional design that senior leaders took when establishing 
the modern program in 1973.  
The U.S. Army has been pursuing methods that produce foreign area 
specialists since WWII. It should be expected that USSOCOM would face some 
similar growing pains as it attempts to establish and expand its similar SOLO 
program. USSOCOM stands only to benefit from additional knowledge and 
understanding of the U.S. Army’s 67 years of successful FAO program 
leadership and partner nation engagement. Current FAO program managers, 
along with their counterparts at USSOCOM, should enjoy a level of comradeship 
with their predecessors as they read this chapter. Collectively, this situation has 
been faced before, and while separated often by decades, many of the same 
problems have been addressed. 
A. THE FOREIGN AREA SPECIALIST AND THE MILITARY ADVISOR  
During World War II, the U.S. Army’s language program trained thousands 
of linguists and oriented them towards specific regions or nations.36 In 1947, the 
U.S. Army established FASP, a direct precursor to the modern U.S. Army FAO 
program, to expand on the language program’s success. The path from FASP to 
FAO is captured in Figure 11.  
36 Neil M. Haggerty, The U.S. Army’s Foreign Area Officer Program (Quantico, VA: The 
United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1974), 8. 
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Figure 11.  The U.S. Army’s Concurrent Efforts; FASP, MAOP, and 
Consolidation into the Modern FAO Program, 1947–1975 
The FASP program provided officers “with knowledge of the language, 
military, history, culture and sociology of a particular region or country, FASP’s 
purpose was to train and utilize officers in positions requiring detailed knowledge 
of foreign areas.”37 FASP was designated a “special career program,” equivalent 
to a contemporary U.S. Army functional area (FA). FASP training could take up 
to four years and consisted of civilian graduate school (one year), language (up 
to two years) and in-country training (one year). FASP officers retained their 
basic branch identity and alternated38 between FASP and basic branch 
assignments. The FASP program fell under the operational oversight of the U.S. 
Army’s Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ASCI),39 and the focus of the 
program gradually shifted to intelligence activities. Officers in the military 
intelligence (MI) branch were heavily recruited for the FASP program, while 
outside of MI, FASP was viewed as a “promotion dead-end,”40 and thus, suffered 
recruiting challenges. 
37 Haggerty, The U.S. Army’s Foreign Area Officer Program, 8. 
38 Alternating is now referred to as “Dual Tracking.” 
39 Haggerty, The U.S. Army’s Foreign Area Officer Program, 9. 
40 Ibid. 
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In May 1965, the U.S. Army convened the Haines Board to “provide a 
blueprint for the Army [officer] school system for the next 10 years.”41 The board 
consisted of four general officers, four colonels, and two lieutenant colonels who 
looked at officer training in general, as well as the specific aspects of all separate 
training programs. In total, the Haines Board made 74 recommendations,42 and 
is credited as the first in a series of reviews that “did more to change the [U.S. 
Army] officer development process than anything else since the end of World 
War II.”43 The board’s recommendation 40 was to “Consolidate the FASP and 
Civil Affairs Specialist Program into a Foreign Studies Specialist Program.”44 
While recommendation 40 was not adopted when the report was published, it 
resulted in General Harold K. Johnson, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army (CSA),45 
convening a specific study based on recommendation 40 under the auspices of 
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER).  
The findings of this subsequent study, known as DCSPER-40, were 
briefed to General Johnson in March 1968. DCSPER-40 recommended leaving 
the FASP program in tact as named, but it also recommended a new program 
that was soon re-designated as the MAOP. Thus, in a time of protracted war, the 
program was intended to address the shortcomings of psychological operations 
(PSYOP) and civil affairs (CA), while bringing together the military functions 
related to advising host nation military forces (MAOP Parallel #1 with SOLO).46 
41 U.S. Army Adjutant General Memorandum, December 9, 1970, Signed by MG Kenneth G. 
Wickham. 
42 Report of the DA Board to Review Army Officer Schools (Haines Board) DCSPER 
November 24, 1970, V. 
43 Arthur T. Coumbe, Army Officer Development: Historical Context (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: 
Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 6. 
44 Report of the DA Board to Review Army Officer Schools (Haines Board) DCSPER 
November 24, 1970, IV. 
45 General Harold K. Johnson was the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army from 1964–1968. 
46 Parallel: The MAOP program was established to meet wartime needs, as was the SOLO 
program. Parallels are highlighted throughout Chapter IV and explored thoroughly in Chapter V. 
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Key to the MAOP program was its “focus on operational issues, separate from 
the intelligence focus of FASP” (MAOP Parallel #2 with SOLO).47 
General Johnson approved the final recommendation of the DSCPER-40, 
and authorized AR 614–134, which charged the MAOP with developing officers 
with “critical skills needed to serve as commanders and advisors and to man key 
staff positions in the conduct of military activities having social, economic, 
political, and psychological impact,”48 with a focus on “developing nations and 
the positive role of indigenous military forces in contributing to [host-nation] 
national development.” General Johnson placed the MAOP program under the 
operational oversight of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS). This 
organizational arrangement was intentionally established to identify the MAOP as 
“operational, with a place for the generalist.”49 
Today, the USASOC is responsible for managing the careers of U.S. Army 
Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) personnel, including PSYOP and CA 
officers, among others. In 1968, however, USASOC did not yet exist and 
DCSOPS managed the PSYOP and CA programs. As a result of the MAOP 
program also forming under DCSOPS, PSYOP and CA officers were heavily 
recruited into the MAOP program. Unfortunately, many had already reached 
career dead ends and would not be promoted to Colonel after entering the 
program at a lower rank (MAOP Parallel #3 with SOLO).50 By 1972, the early 
selection issues had been corrected by adopting extremely stringent selection 
47 Parallel: The MAOP program was to focus on operational issues vice intelligence 
collection, the same focus as the SOLO program. 
48 Robert D. Ramsey III, Advising Indigenous Forces, American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, 
and El Salvador, Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 18 (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat 
Studies Institute Press, 2006), 63. 
49 Haggerty, The U.S. Army’s Foreign Area Officer Program, 13; Parallel: Reiterates MAOP 
operational focus. 
50 Parallel: The MAOP program struggled with getting its officers promoted, just as the SOLO 
program struggles today. 
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criteria. Applicants admitted into the MAOP program from 1972 onward were, 
thus, in their respective branch’s top bracket.51 
Generally, candidate requirements for the MAOP program were as 
follows: rank of Captain (CPT) to Colonel (COL), completion of appropriate level 
of military schooling; Bachelor of Arts (BA) degree or higher, exceptional 
performance record, language proficiency of 3/3 or higher, minimum of three 
years of active duty service remaining (MAOP Parallel #4 with SOLO).52 
Candidates were selected into the program based on previously acquired core 
competencies. Additionally, a 19–22 week course was taught at the JFK Center 
for Special Warfare53 at Ft. Bragg, NC and remained required training for officers 
in the MAOP program. Part of the course included interagency training held in 
Washington, DC, which allowed “students to meet in conference with officials 
from the highest levels of government and the private sector.”54 The MAOP 
advisor course was tailored to the individual MAOP assignment.55 The JFK 
Center for Special Warfare even changed its name following the MAOP pilot 
programs to the JFK Center for Military Assistance to best reflect its training 
relationship with the U.S. Army MAOP program. Officers serving in the MAOP 
program could expect to alternate between their MAOP utilization and 
assignments in their basic Army branch. 
Although a need for thousands of MAOP positions was anticipated, only 
433 officers were participating in MAOP by 1972. Compared with 563 officers in 
FASP, it was obvious that the Army was having trouble attracting quality 
personnel in the quantity that the MAOP program needed (Parallel #5).56 In 
51 Haggerty, The U.S. Army’s Foreign Area Officer Program, 19. 
52 Parallel: Generally, the MAOP program desired similar qualifications as SOLO.  
53 Since renamed to “U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School” or 
USAJFKSWCS. 
54 Haggerty, The U.S. Army’s Foreign Area Officer Program, 16. 
55 Ibid., 14. 
56 Ramsey, Advising Indigenous Forces, American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El 
Salvador, 64; Parallel: Both MAOP and SOLO experienced difficulty in attracting ideally qualified 
personnel. 
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1973, the U.S. Army combined the FASP and MAOP programs into the 
contemporary FAO program (see Figure 14). The decision was based on the 
belief that the FASP and MAOP programs were so similar that they would profit 
from a single personnel management system.57 It should be noted that even 
after the merger, the 22-week course at Ft. Bragg was retained as a phase of 
required training for the new FAO program.58  
The final, and perhaps, most compelling historical parallel between MAOP 
and SOLO, is the overall environment that resulted in the complete 
reconfiguration of the MAOP program as the Vietnam War came to a conclusion. 
As shown in Figure 12, MAOP and SOLO were created at a time when funding 
was readily available and the force was expanding. When budgets began 
shrinking as the Vietnam War drew to a close, the U.S. Army sought to gain 
efficiencies by merging the similar FASP and MAOP programs into the Army 
FAO program. No such decision has been made for the SOLO program, but as 
Figure 12 shows, the SOLO program is operating under very similar budgetary 
and troop strength conditions that contributed to the end of MAOP. 
57 Haggerty, The U.S. Army’s Foreign Area Officer Program, 20. 
58 Ibid., 16. 
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Figure 12.  Parallel Drawdown Environment; MAOP in 1973 and SOLO in 
201459 
General Johnson allowed a year for the merger of FASP and MAOP, and 
directed that a Foreign Area Officer Management System (FAOMS) committee, 
consisting of members from Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations & 
Plans (ODCSOPS), Army Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (ACSI), and Office 
of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel (ODCSPER) be established to coordinate 
the merger.60 Additionally, the FAOMS established a board of General Officers 
(GOs) to provide senior level direction and guidance, which naturally increased 
senior leader buy-in for the new program. These GOs, with perhaps no prior 
official interests in the FAO program, were now personally vested in its success. 
The FAOMS formed the merger plans and approved all staff agreements 
for the new program. Additional skill identifiers (ASIs) were used as personnel 
59 Brad Plumer, “America’s Staggering Defense Budget, in Charts,” The Washington Post, 
January 7, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/07/everything-
chuck-hagel-needs-to-know-about-the-defense-budget-in-charts/. 





















                                            
management tools to identify essential training for FAO positions. The ASIs were 
included in personnel requisition documents to insure proper identification of all 
FAO positions. Furthermore, only positions validated by the Army for graduate 
degree training would be designated as FAO billets.61  
The FAOMS committee submitted a final report that informed the FAO 
program regulation published in March 1973. Most significantly, the regulation 
placed the new program under the operational oversight of the DCSOPS vice the 
ASCI. The program was intended to maintain its established operations focus. 
The ASCI would continue to monitor intelligence assignments, as well as the 
overseas phase of training. DCSOPS was also charged with chairing a board of 
stakeholders in the new FAO program. FAO program advice was, therefore, 
systematically sought from key Army staff elements, representatives from the 
Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and the JFK Center for 
Military Assistance.62 
All prior FASP and MAOP officers were automatically accepted into the 
FAO program, and could still expect to alternate between assignments in the new 
FAO program and their basic branch, just as before. A significant change, due to 
FAOs close ties to the Army’s new (in 1974) officer personnel management 
system (OPMS), was the FAO program’s inclusion as one of 47 specialties that 
contain sufficient duty positions to support career progression to the rank of 
COL.63 
A significant metric still in use by the FAO proponent to measure the value 
of a program is the promotion rate of the officers who serve within the specific 
program.64 Following the merger of the FASP and MAOP in 1973, FAO officers 
did exceptionally well. In 1974, compared to 68% of eligible officers being 
61 Haggerty, The U.S. Army’s Foreign Area Officer Program, 21. 
62 Ibid., 22. 
63 OPMS Fact Sheet, Updated 1974. 
64 DWG FAO Proponent, Washington, DC, March 14, 2014. 
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promoted Army-wide, 90% of eligible FAOs were promoted.65 This percentage is 
important both as a metric for the program’s ability to meet Army mission 
requirements, and to highlight the successful processes that the Army used to 
establish broad support for its new program. Even as one stakeholder (ASCI) lost 
overall organizational control in favor of another stakeholder (DCSOPS), the 
ASCI was able to maintain assignment authority over the ASI coded personnel 
that now belonged to the FAO program.66 The intelligence-oriented FAOs fell 
under the operational oversight of DCSOPS, but individual positions were 
managed by the ASCI. The importance of this arrangement in the early days of 
the FAO program is significant for two reasons. The quantity of former FASP 
program officers whose positions were managed outside of DCSOPS channels, 
and the U.S. Army’s institutional acceptance of the new FAO program as 
evidenced by its promotion rate was 22% higher than the U.S. Army average in 
its very first year of existence.  
B. LINKING THE “SINGLE-TRACK” TO A REPEAT CAPABILITY GAP 
In 1973, the FAO program “blended the best of both FASP and MAOP”67 
and provided the political-military officer capability that the U.S. Army required, 
largely unchanged, until 1997. Beginning in 1997, however, FAOs would no 
longer alternate between FAO positions and positions in their basic Army branch 
(dual-track to single-track). This change enabled the FAO functional area to 
provide the Army better skills on the FASP end of the FAO skills spectrum, but at 
a cost to individual officers and the Army in terms of both operational relevance 
and the “blended”68 skills on the MAOP end of the FAO skills spectrum.  
In addition to the post-1997 challenge of operational relevance, the FAO 
program continued its FASP-legacy intelligence focus. Today, U.S. Army FAOs 
65 Haggerty, The U.S. Army’s Foreign Area Officer Program, 28.  
66 Ibid., 22. 
67 Ibid., 23. 
68 Ibid. 
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account for more than 1/3rd of all Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) strategic 
information.69 The U.S. Army’s experience in the Vietnam War placed a 
substantial amount of stress on its post-WWII FASP program, revealing a 
capability gap that resulted in the Army’s development of the MAOP program. 
Implementing the single-track FAO career model, while also continuing the FAO 
program’s intelligence focus, appears to have recreated conditions in peacetime 
for modern FAOs that plagued the intelligence-oriented FASP program, and the 
Army, so significantly in a time of protracted conflict during the Vietnam war.  
The events of September 11, 2001, and the prolonged wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, once again placed substantial strain on the U.S. Army as a 
whole, and on the contemporary single-track Army FAO program, in particular. 
An example of this strain occurred in 2010, when the Chief of Staff of the U.S. 
Army allowed midcareer FAOs to compete on the annual command selection list 
(CSL) for command of military transition teams (MiTTs). While “381 FAOs were 
eligible to compete…only 3 officers—less than 1% of the available pool—were 
selected for MiTT command.”70 A contemporary explanation for this below 
average selection rate “is that the seasoned FAO population lacks the kind of 
operational experiences that both pervade the post-9/11 Army and are valued by 
selection boards.”71 U.S. Army FAOs remain regionally focused political-military 
experts, but the strain and pressure of continuous war and global commitments 
have once again re-emphasized a need for contemporary operational relevance, 
particularly where CSL boards and globally oriented SOF commanders are 
concerned. Figure 13 shows the SOF-operations-focused SOLO program 
alongside the intelligence-oriented Army FAO program. Although separated by 
nearly 40 years, Figure 13 displays a striking similarity to Figure 11. 
69 U.S. Army FAO Strategic Leadership Division Overview Briefing, FAO Proponent, March 
14, 2014.  
70 Daniel E. Mouton, “The Army’s Foreign Area Officer Program: To Wither or to Improve?” 
Army Magazine, March 2011, 22. 
71 Mouton, “The Army’s Foreign Area Officer Program: To Wither or to Improve?” 22. 
Mouton’s 2nd explanation was that the “Army as a whole lack the appropriate guidance from the 
Chief of Staff of the Army as to how the FAO career path can serve the Army’s requirements.” 
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Figure 13.  The U.S. Army’s Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Program and 
Origin of the USSOCOM SOLO Program 
C. CONCLUSION 
Compelling similarities exist between the U.S. Army’s Vietnam-era MAOP 
program and the USSOCOM SOLO program. These similarities are presented in 
context throughout this chapter, and concisely presented in Figure 14.  
 
Figure 14.  Table of MAOP and SOLO Parallels from Chapter IV 
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Both the Vietnam War, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, have 
demonstrated that the demand for operations-focused officers with regional 
expertise increases in a time of protracted armed conflict. When this capability 
demand is not readily available from existing programs, the requisite capability is 
likely to be built by a service, or a service-like command, such as USSOCOM. 
This capability gap drove the establishment of MAOP in 1969 when the 
intelligence-focused FASP program could not meet the Army’s wartime needs 
alone. A similar capability demand led to the SOLO program’s beginning in 2006, 
when contemporary SOF wartime needs72 could not be met by the Army’s 
single-track FAO program. History has thus provided stark parallels that have 
informed our in-depth analysis and subsequent recommendations that are 
presented in Chapter V. 
72 See LTC Mouton’s comments on page 38 of this chapter. 
 43 
                                            
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 44 
V. COURSES OF ACTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The research team began this study with the set of nine questions 
presented by USSOCOM J55 SOLO program managers, which were reduced to 
four manageable questions listed in Chapter I. This chapter presents three COAs 
for USSOCOM SOLO program managers as they pursue a renewed and 
enhanced program in support of the GSN. This chapter provides and evaluates 
the advantages and disadvantages of three COAs using criteria compiled from 
USSOCOM official documents, numerous working group discussions, and 
comparative analysis. The three COAs are enhanced status quo, the SF-FAO 
option, and alignment with USASOC initiative. Each of the three COAs gives 
USSOCOM viable options to renew the SOLO program. 
1. COA 1: Enhanced Status Quo  
All stakeholders agree that the SOLO capability is a critical component to 
the enhancement of the GSN. With this in mind, COA 1: enhanced status quo is 
presented. Figure 15 represents the SOLO program operating independent of the 
FAO program. 
 
Figure 15.  Enhanced Status Quo Option Affording USSOCOM an 
Enhanced SOLO Capability 
This COA will afford USSOCOM an enhanced SOLO capability by 
addressing stated concerns and USSOCOM’s noted issues. The enhanced 
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“status quo” COA, as the name implies, involves the maintenance of the program 
as described in Chapter III with two enhancements. These additional 
enhancements may provide stakeholders and candidates alike the requisite 
knowledge and understanding of the program.  
a. Program Execution: Socialize the Program 
USSOCOM SOLO program managers need to socialize the SOLO 
program actively. The lack of socialization is likely the most significant reason for 
the lack of service component buy-in discovered during the research. The fact 
that most of the individuals who fall into the category of “would-be candidates” for 
the SOLO program do not even know that it exists presents a serious issue for 
the program in its current state. Most troubling is the lack of knowledge and 
understanding of the SOLO program at U.S. Army SF Proponency and U.S. 
Army SF branch. While all stakeholders with knowledge of the program who 
participated in this study supported the SOLO program, as well as the individual 
officers who served as SOLOs; it remains incumbent on USSOCOM to ensure 
that U.S. Army SF leaders and personnel managers are aware that the program 
exists.  
Connecting the line of communication between USSOCOM SOLO 
Mangers in the J55 and SF branch managers will provide a key first step toward 
socialization. 
A requisite second step is for USSOCOM to reach out to the centers of 
excellence listed with information briefings and recruitment packets. 
• United States Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, 
KS: U.S. Army SF field grade officers attend a myriad of courses 
including intermediate level education (ILE), the Schools of 
Advanced Military Studies, and the School for Command 
Preparation. Additionally, students represent interagency partners 
that attend these courses as well.  
• The Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA: U.S. Army SF 
field grade officers attend NPS prior to returning to the force to 
complete the key and developmental assignments. A small 
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population of SF senior leaders also completes fellowships at NPS 
in lieu of attending the Army War College. 
• The Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, PA: Senior Army SF 
officers, and senior level officers from across the Army, attend the 
war college in route to senior Army and joint leadership positions. 
• At the various SF operational groups and TSOCs: Almost all 
potential candidates for the SOLO program will complete their key 
and developmental assignments in these locations distributed 
around the world. 
Distributing to the listed locations will have immediate effects across the SF 
regiment as potential candidates are informed of its existence and the mission 
and benefits associated with the assignment. 
USSOCOM should prepare articles to be published in journals and other 
mediums read by prospective SOLO recruits, as well as senior U.S. Army and 
Joint Force leaders with the intent of expanding knowledge about the existence 
of the program. The articles should focus on informing the audience of the 
program, highlighting successful implementation, and the benefits associated 
with the assignment. Again the object is to inform the force overall and increase 
self-selection into the program as officers eligible for consideration become 
familiar with the program and the benefits of participation. More importantly, 
awareness can potentially help USSOCOM to attain service buy-in throughout 
the U.S. Army Special Forces Command (USASFC) and USASOC community, 
as well as the Army and DOD writ large. 
b. Program Execution: Work Hand-in-Hand with SF Branch 
Managers and Proponency 
While the socialization of the program will improve the understanding of 
the program, it will not directly affect the functionality of the program. It will not 
help to improve the personnel management of the officers who serve as SOLOs 
or their potential for career enhancement. USSOCOM SOLO program managers 
must work more directly and deliberately with Army SF personnel and SF 
Proponency representatives.  
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Working with SF personnel managers who work from SF branch (Human 
Resources Command, Fort Knox, KY) will be required to improve the program to 
reduce the strain on SF branch managers to find, select, and emplace qualified 
officers for SOLO assignments in a timely manner. Finding the qualified officers 
for a SOLO assignment requires branch managers to scour personnel records to 
find the officers who not only meet the desired qualifications, but also are eligible 
to be moved to this assignment without negatively affecting their career or their 
family. Additionally, creating new assignments for SF officers who have 
associated qualification creates new demands on branch managers.  
Highlighted in Figure 16 are the statistics that underlie the importance of 
working with branch managers in advance to avoid creating issues with the 
personnel responsible for manning these assignments for USSOCOM. 
Specifically, only two field grade officers have the desired 3/3/3 language 
qualification and five with a 2/2/2 who could possibly serve in USSOCOM’s 
pending SOLO position in Kuwait. It is not a large pool to choose from, especially 
when the selection is compounded by the fact that these potential candidates 
may not meet any of the other desired SOLO qualifications. 
 
Figure 16.  Pending SOLO Billets Coded for SF Officers 
In addition to SOLO qualifications, these service members may be 
ineligible for a PCS move or have no desire to participate in the SOLO program 
due to its terminal nature that results in the most qualified people being placed 
elsewhere, which will detrimentally affect the SOLO program. By working closely 
with branch representatives, USSOCOM and SF branch will be able to get in 
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front of the assignment cycle and address the current reactive nature of the 
SOLO assignment process, a USSOCOM identified weakness of the SOLO 
program. 
Working with SF Proponent leaders will directly address the potential for 
an SF officer’s career enhancement through participation in the SOLO program. 
While it may not result in the codification of the SOLO program as a key and 
developmental assignment, the equivalent of a battalion-level command for an 
O–5/LTC, it could result in SOLO becoming codified as a broadening assignment 
in AR 600–3. This identification will help with recruitment by serving as a reward 
for officers assigned as SOLOs by keeping them competitive for promotion. 
Officers at SF Proponency have indicated that this type of action is within the 
realm of possibility, however, it has not been formally addressed in their office.73 
Working closely with SF branch/SF Proponency personnel will also help 
with the coordination of SOLO recruitment efforts timed in accordance with officer 
career milestones, such as ILE, service War College, promotion and command 
select boards. The timeline proposed in Figure 17 is an example of what an SF 
officer’s career timeline could look like including SOLO assignment(s). 
 
Figure 17.  SF Officer’s Career Timeline Showing Potential for SOLO 
Assignments 
73 Working Groups with SF Proponency personnel at Fort Bragg, NC, March 12, 2014.  
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c. Advantages/Disadvantages of Enhanced Status Quo Option 
(1) Promotion Opportunities. Disadvantage. This COA will not directly 
do anything to address the current terminal nature of the SOLO assignment.  
(2) Potential for Promotion to O6. Disadvantage. This COA does not 
directly address USSOCOM’s desire to make officers selected to participate in 
the SOLO program competitive for promotion to the rank of O–6. 
(3) Adequate Supply of Qualified SF Officers. Advantage. By 
socializing the program and working more closely with SF branch and 
Proponency personnel, USSOCOM will increase its pool of potential SOLO 
candidates. It is assessed that this COA will result in increased self-nomination 
and efficiency of assignments and an SF officer’s actual career managers will be 
more engaged in the process. 
(4) Program Known Outside of USSOCOM. Advantage. By preparing, 
publishing, and distributing products, USSOCOM will directly address the issues 
currently associated with a lack of knowledge and understanding of the program. 
(5) SOLOs Receive Language, Culture and Interagency Training. 
Disadvantage. This COA does not provide any additional training for SF officers 
selected to serve as SOLOs. USSOCOM will have to rely upon skills and 
experiences that the officers already have prior to selection to the program. 
(6) SOLO’s Family Is Prepared for Life Away From U.S. Military Base 
OCONUS. Disadvantage. This COA will not directly help the officer’s family to 
better prepare and assimilate for life overseas, away from a military base. While 
increased knowledge and understanding will likely aid in decreasing the strain, it 
will not be enough to adequately prepare the officer or his family. 
(7) USSOCOM and TSOCs Maintain 100% Control of SOLO 
Assignments. Advantage. This COA maintains 100% control of the assignment 
process at the USSOCOM and TSOC level. While noted as a reactive and ad-
hoc process, it has worked to this point. 
 50 
2. COA 2: The SF-FAO Option 
The SF-FAO option is predicated by the acceptance that USSOCOM 
wants to retain the SOLO capability and desires that the officers who participate 
remain competitive for promotion to O–6. This COA indicates a level of 
acceptance of history’s ability to repeat itself as highlighted in Chapter IV’s 
comparative analysis. The current course being pursued by USSOCOM mirrors 
that of the MAOP program’s inception during the Vietnam War. It is our 
assessment that for many of the same reasons it was deemed a good COA then, 
it remains a viable COA for consideration today, as illustrated by Figure 18. It is 
necessary to acknowledge up front that this COA will require much more work on 
the part of USSOCOM, SF, and FAO leaders. 
 
Figure 18.  SF-FAO Option Providing Capability and Personnel 
Management 
The U.S. Army FAO program is an established, successful functional area 
within the Operations Support Career Designation field. This COA would directly 
improve the officer’s ability to compete for promotion to O-6. It would require SF 
branch to release a number of officers to the FAO Branch, thus losing direct 
control of the officers and their career management. The officers would officially 
transition to the FAO branch (FA48), which ends their careers as SF officers 
(18A). Therefore, all affected officers would have their careers managed by FAO 
Branch and Proponency personnel.  




Figure 19.  Current and Projected SF Field Grade Officer Strength74 
SF is thus presented the opportunity to reduce the number of field grade 
officers in its formation—as required by the U.S. Army—while assisting the FAO 
branch in manning its ranks. The transfer of officers between the branches was 
also offered by FAO branch in the form of an email on March 11, 2014. The 
email, drafted by the SF Branch Chief, was targeting U.S. Army officers eligible 
for consideration of transferring into the functional area. It specifically stated, 
“Special Operations Officers have additional opportunities. . . SOF officers may 
be selected as Special Operations Liaison Officers (SOLOs) with key allies,”75 
indicating that the branch may be receptive to an agreement of this type. 
Depending upon the agreement reached between stakeholders affected 
by this COA, many of the stated concerns are addressed, but the lack of control 
over assignments and operational relevancy may be degraded.  
a. Advantages/Disadvantages of SF-FAO Option 
(1) Promotion Opportunities. Advantage. Officers who transfer into the 
FAO branch will always remain competitive for promotion, as all the SOLO 
74 SF Branch Brief, February 12, 2013, Presented at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
CA.  
75 “Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Transfer Opportunities email from U.S. Army Human 
Resources Command, FAO Branch Chief LTC David M. Kobs, March 11, 2014. 
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assignments are codified as key and development. It will support promotion 
opportunities regardless of when the officer enters the program. 
(2) Potential for Promotion to O6. Advantage. By transferring to the 
Operations Support Career Designation Field, the officers will become much 
more competitive for promotion to O–6. Currently, the SOLO assignment is not 
likely to ever be considered or codified as the equivalent of a Battalion Command 
with SF branch. 
(3) Adequate Supply of Qualified SF Officers. Advantage. All officers in 
the Army are contacted at several points throughout their career offering options, 
such as the one proposed. In other words, all SF officers will be informed of the 
opportunity that exists for SOLO assignments, promotions, and all other 
associated benefits, which will result in an increase in the number of potential 
SOLOs, as the information will be presented. Disadvantage. Operational 
relevancy will likely be degraded as the officers FAO typically tries to draw into 
the program enter in between the eight and eleven years of service point in their 
career. Thus, the experiences garnered by the SF officers during their major KD 
time (indicated in Figure 17) will be lost. Most stakeholders, including FAO, 
identified operational relevancy as a major key to SOLO success and a current 
advantage over the FAO program.76 
(4) Program Known Outside of USSOCOM. Advantage. Utilizing this 
COA will ensure that the opportunity is better communicated throughout the Army 
and across the various embassies at which FAOs and SOLOs serve. Not only 
will the program be known outside of USSOCOM, it will also be coordinated, 
funded, and distributed by FAO branch as it will be used to appeal to potential 
SF-FAO officers. 
(5) SOLOs Receive Language, Culture and Interagency Training. 
Advantage. As part of the FAO life cycle, all officers will receive language 
training, ILE, a Master’s degree, and in region training. Disadvantage. Again, 
76 Working Group Roundtables at USSOCOM HQ, December 1–5, 2013; FAO Working 
Group Roundtable at Washington, DC, FAO Proponent, March 14, 2014.  
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officers will be removed from the SF branch prior to receiving the valued 
experience as an SF Major. This operational relevancy of the SOLO will be 
degraded as a result. 
(6) SOLO’s Family Is Prepared for Life Away From U.S. Military Base 
OCONUS. Advantage. FAOs have a commendable track record of attending to 
the needs of families. Spouses of FAOs may also be provided language and 
cultural training prior to a deployment to a foreign country.  
(7) USSOCOM and TSOCs Maintain 100% Control of SOLO 
Assignments. Disadvantage. Since the FAO Branch and Proponency will 
manage the officers, USSOCOM and the TSOCs will have a diminished 
capability to hand-select the officers for the critical SOLO positions.  
3. COA 3: Alignment with USASOC Initiative 
This COA requires that USASOC and/or USASFC support the alignment 
of the SOLO program with a supported, codified addition to AR 600–3, as 
illustrated in Figure 20.  
 
Figure 20.  SOLO Aligned with Codified USASOC/USASFC Initiative 
Initiatives are concurrently being developed and codified by the USASOC 
Office of Special Warfare. The codification of these initiatives makes the 
participating officers competitive for promotion as assignments are codified in AR 
600–3. Moreover, it is a clear indication that the assignment is actively supported 
by the Army at large and propagated by SF branch and proponenecy personnel. 
This COA will require much more work on the part of USASOC, USASFC, and 
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USSOCOM, but provides the only SOF-only bilateral option for a renewed SOLO 
program. 
a. Advantages/Disadvantages of Alignment USASOC Initiative 
(1) Promotion Opportunities. Advantage. If codified as key and 
developmental, the assignment will have promotion appeal at Army promotion 
and command select boards. If codification of key and developmental is not 
supported, the potential for it to become a “broadening” assignment exists and 
should be pursued. The SOLO assignment will be listed in AR 600–3 and 
indicated that it is beneficial for an officer’s career to participate.  
(2) Potential for Promotion to O–6. Disadvantage. It will be difficult to 
pass through the SF regiment and the Army in the maneuver, fires and effects 
career designation field. Currently, the only assignment making an O–5 
competitive for promotion to O–6 in the SF branch is a Battalion Command. 
Advantage. If aligned with a USASOC initiative and codified in AR 600–3, all 
officers participating in the program at the rank of O–5 would be competitive for 
promotion to the rank of O–6. 
(3) Adequate Supply of Qualified SF Officers. Advantage. Again, if 
codified as key and developmental or broadening, all SF officers will be informed 
of the potential SOLO assignments to include information regarding prerequisite 
requirements that will help influence officers to maintain and/or acquire the skills 
necessary to participate therein. 
(4) Program Known Outside of USSOCOM. Advantage. The 
assignment would be actively supported and broadcasted throughout SF. Part of 
it would include its inclusion in command and branch media. 
(5) SOLOs Receive Language, Culture and Interagency Training. 
Advantage. If supported, the officers will have already been trained in, and 
maintained a target language, received experience in embassies within a TSOC 
AOR, and worked with interagency partners. 
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(6) SOLO’s Family Is Prepared for Life Away From U.S. Military Base 
OCONUS. Advantage. SOLO’s families would be more prepared for this type of 
lifestyle, as they would have already experienced it prior to serving as a SOLO. 
(7) USSOCOM and TSOCs Maintain 100% Control of SOLO 
Assignments. Advantage. While it would be an additional burden on the 
personnel management entities of USASOC, USASFC, and USSOCOM, it would 
provide 100% control over the assignments process. 
B. SUMMARY 
We have summarized many of our observations in Table 2. In closing this 
chapter, the research team reiterates that all three COAs presented will support 
the stated goals USSOCOM outlined at the onset of the study.  




All COAs have different costs and benefits associated, as well as varying 
degrees of difficulty in implementation. However, all are assessed as being 
feasible and achievable in the near term. COA 1 presents USSOCOM with 
perhaps the most easily and quickly executable COA, but the associated 
drawbacks could lead to the extension and complication of the current issues 
Status Quo SF-FAO Option Aligned with USASOC
Promotion opportunities X + +
Potential for promotion of O6 X + +
Adequate supply of qualified officers + + +
Program known outside of USSSOCOM + + +
SOLOs receive language, culture & 
interagency training X + +
SOLOs family prepared for l ife away from 
military base OCONUS X + +
USSOCOM & TSOCs maintain 100% 
control of personnel assignments (BNR) + X +
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negatively affecting the program. COA 2 presents a very appealing option, as it 
will decrease the demands on USSOCOM, USASOC, and USASFC. However, 
the loss of control over the assignments may present an irreconcilable issue 
between the associated stakeholders. COA 3 positively addresses the concerns 
proposed by USSOCOM SOLO program managers, but may be the most difficult 
to implement. Even if USASOC and USASFC support and align the program, 
Department of the Army-level support for the codification of the SOLO 
assignment as a command equivalent presents a serious obstacle.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Over the 10-month course of this study, we are convinced now more than 
ever that the SOLO program is a worthwhile endeavor. Hundreds of hours of 
discussion involving 35 stakeholders from 14 organizations have made a 
convincing argument. Not once have we heard that the program lacks value, 
which legitimizes the purpose of this study. How is it possible to provide a 
regionally focused “SOF FAO” capability to USSOCOM? As stated in Chapter I, 
the following questions were asked in pursuit of accomplishing this purpose. 
• Do other parallels exists from other programs to inform a renewed 
regional SOF career track/program? 
• U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer Program (FAO: 1973–
Present) 
• U.S. Army Foreign Area Specialist Program (FASP: 1947–
1973) 
• U.S. Army Military Advisor Officer Program (MAOP: 1969–
1973) 
• Based on this review of other programs, what features could inform 
a renewed SOLO program? 
• Based on this review of other programs, what life cycle model could 
inform a renewed SOLO program? 
• What issues are likely to impede the implementation of a renewed 
SOLO program and how can SOF address them? 
A. LOOKING BACK TO SEE THE FUTURE 
Just as the MAOP program emerged during the Vietnam War, the SOLO 
program emerged during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)/Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF). The sequence of events surrounding the 1973 convergence of 
the MAOP and FASP programs into the FAO program is reoccurring now. We 
are not recommending to follow blindly in these predecessors’ steps. However, 
ignoring the path they have illuminated would be ill advised. As Mark Twain said, 
“History doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme.” These lessons learned have 
been captured and incorporated into the COAs we have recommended. 
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B. WAY AHEAD 
In the course of this multimethod project, three COAs emerged: 1) 
enhance the status quo, 2) merge the SOLO program into FAO, and 3) alignment 
with a USASOC initiative. Archival data, stakeholder working groups, and 
comparative case analysis, not only helped reveal viable COAs, but also helped 
answer the aforementioned research questions. We submit that the proposed 
COAs will satisfy three of the five military decision-making criteria: suitability, 
feasibility, and distinguishability. Further research is suggested to determine the 
remaining two criteria, acceptability, and completeness.  
Acceptability is going to require GO involvement. Although our stakeholder 
working groups helped develop acceptable COAs, the recommended COAs have 
never been briefed to the identified organizational stakeholders in their entirety. 
Creating the FAO program in 1973 required GO involvement and buy-in from all 
relevant stakeholders. We submit that acceptability of their COAs will never be 
complete without similar GO involvement and buy-in from all of the identified 
stakeholders. We recommend effort be made to build a consensus of the most 
acceptable COA before more resources are consumed in this current limited 
resource environment.  
Although we incorporated multimethods in our study, we acknowledge the 
incompleteness of the research due to time constraints. Finding a consensus of 
human resource life cycle model criteria, involving all relevant stakeholders, was 
outside the scope of this study, and due in part, to a lack of quantifiable data. We 
suggest a follow-on survey be conducted similar to the 2012 QuickCompass of 
Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) and Supervisors (2012 QFAO), which was 
conducted on behalf of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense of 
Personnel and Readiness (OUSD[P&R]). The hope is that future quantifiable 
research will more fully develop recommended COAs.  
In the business world, good people, good products/services, and good 
processes are needed. All three are necessary for ultimate effectiveness. It has 
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been established that the SOLO program offers a valuable service. The people, 
the current SOLOs, and their project managers are making this service possible. 
Our recommendations in the form of COAs offer ways to improve the SOLO 
program and support the people who make it possible.  
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